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Abstract 
The post-World War II reconstruction of global trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has been a significant topic of discussion in the analyses of 
numerous bilateral economic relations, including those that are located in Asia 
Pacific.  Since the reconstruction, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have 
increasingly internalised trade and FDI in markets where they are active.  
Markets and MNE activities have grown together while governments have 
become more responsive to this process.  This paper discusses the above 
process along with an analysis of the rise and development of the economic 
relationship between Australia and Japan from the immediate post-World War 
II phase through Australia’s neo-liberal trade policy phase.  The post-World 
War II relationship began in the 1950s, and grew during the Cold War years, 
the end of which has created competitive pressures on the Australian economy.  
Australia has tried to overcome this by progressively adapting a unilateral 
neo-liberal trade policy and encouraging its trade and investment partners to 
do the same, unsuccessfully in most cases where such partners have extensive 
state subsidy structures in place.  The paper discusses the effects of major 
events such as the Plaza Accord and the end of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’ on 
the relationship.  The discussion extends into the development of new 
challenges in the 2010s. 
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Asia and its Pacific seaboard have become a region with robust growth and 
rapidly developing political and strategic challenges.  There are many nations 
that are presently seeking bilateral free trade agreements.  Hence, the nature 
of trade in the region is being modified.  China’s preference, as the largest 
market, for bilateral, rather than multilateral, relations with the rest of the 
region, in particular, have been receiving much attention (Cai 2010, Chinn 
2009, Dent 2010, Nabers 2008).  Among other nations of the region, the 
strength of respective relationships built after World War II, have been tested 
from different perspectives (Jain and Bruni 2004, Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn 
2008, Richardson 2011b, Schoenbaum 2008, Tow et al. 2007, Yamakage 1997). 
Focus on bilateral trade agreements are characterised by the desire of the 
nations to connect political ties along with the economic ones (Ito 2010: 19).  
The way in which the post-World War II political settlements have begun 
facing new challenges has attracted increasing attention (Beeson and 
Yoshimatsu 2007, Dent 2009, Rumley 2005, Shigematsu 2006).  Not every 
bilateral relationship in the region is governed by an FDI and trade 
agreement. South Korea has ratified a free trade agreement with the US in 
2011.  Japan does not yet have a bilateral investment treaty with the US, 
which is a major destination of Japanese FDI (Tobin and Busch 2010: 14).  Nor 
does Japan yet have such a treaty with Australia or South Korea.  Australia 
signed a free trade agreement with the US in 2004 (Dee 2005).  It is 
negotiating similar agreements with others.  Being able to continue to export 
its resources and agricultural produce to Asia Pacific is the most significant 
aspect of Australia’s focus on the changes in the region (AJS 2009, Bisley 2004, 
Drysdale 2010, Fitzpatrick 1990).  Australia has not yet signed free trade 
agreements with Japan, South Korea, and China though they are being 
negotiated.  Presently, Trans Pacific Partnership is an ongoing multilateral 
process that involves Australia, and other Asia Pacific nations (Richardson 
2011a).   
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The post-World War II trade structure 
 
The global economic system has been built on three distinct phases, the post-
World War II “system”, preceded by the 1930s’ period of protectionism and 
national autarchic competition (the post-World War I period), which followed 
the Pax Britannica (with its the gold standard, as opposed to the present 
dollar-indexed exchange rates) that collapsed with the start of World War I 
(Hirst Thompson 1999: 8).  The period in which we now live is  different in 
many ways, from the post-World War II period economy though  there is little 
consensus on which theoretical framework(s) accurately describe it (Quiggin 
2010).  One significant question for the purposes of this paper is whether  the 
rise and development of Australia’s trade and investment relationship with 
Japan is explainable solely by the post-World War II theory frameworks.  An 
earlier version of a section of this paper previously appeared in Bayari (2012a). 
 
At the end of World War II, the US policy makers were determined to restore 
an ‘open world economy’ based on the principles of a ‘self-regulating market’ 
(Block and Somers 1985: 74).  This paper does not discuss the veracity of the 
notion that markets can ‘self-regulate’.  The post-World War II system was 
based on the assumption of such ‘self-regulation’.  As it is well-known, the 
framework of the contemporary international governance, including that of 
trade and FDI, became grounded in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference.  This 
conference proposed an International Trade Organization (ITO) to complement 
the functions of the IMF and World Bank, and its charter was completed in 
1948  (Bossche 2005: 79).  The charter, however, never passed the US 
Congress, and the ITO never eventuated.   
 
In 1947, the GATT was signed and over the years it became the de facto ITO, 
and seven rounds of GATT negotiations were completed (Bossche 2005: 81).  In 
1994, the GATT framework was institutionalised by the WTO, at the eight 
(Uruguay) round.  The original GATT rules and principles remain operational 
under the WTO.  Australia was an original GATT signatory, though with 
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serious reservations, and did not commit to cut its manufacturing tariffs as 
other signatories were unwilling to commit to reducing their agricultural 
tariffs (Arndt 1965).  Japan joined GATT in January 1956.  The Doha round 
(the ninth) of the WTO began in November 2001 but is yet incomplete, and 
each round took longer to complete since the first one in Geneva in April 1947.   
 
Theories that cover the centuries-old social phenomenon of cross border 
business either focus on trade or FDI trends (Morgan and Katsikeas 1997).  
But rarely on both phenomenon simultaneously.  Hirschman (1945) saw the 
dynamics of the post-World War II interstate trade bargaining in terms of 
differentiation based on the notions of ‘co-operation’ and ‘non-co-operation’.  In 
the construction of the framework to define the post-World War II global trade 
order, there has been debate on the role of the states’ foreign policies, and their 
functions (Ikenberry et al. 1988).  Kindleberger (1973) proposed that the 
existence of a single hegemon can be a stabilising force that can prevent global 
economic closure.  This framework was a precursor to ‘hegemonic stability 
theory’, which holds that the origin of the post-World War II ‘open trading 
system’ is the result of the emergence of the US as a ‘hegemonic state’, similar 
to the hegemony exercised by the UK from the 19th century till its collapse in 
1914 (McKeown 1983).   
 
There are factors beyond the issue of hegemony in international trade, as per 
Snidal (1985).  The cooperation of the nations is also a factor, and as a 
hegemony has many facets, the hegemonic stability theory has limitations 
(Snidal 1985).  The inter-state politics of trade is a challenge to the arguably 
stable nature of this theory (Gowa 1989).  The ‘cooperative game theory’ 
perspective in Snidal’s hegemony framework proposes that the aspects of 
acquiescence, coercion, challenge and coalitions, among others, are inherent to 
the relationship between the hegemon and the rest (Goodin et al. 2005).  
Following Waltz’s (1979) ‘structural realism’ theory, Lake suggests the 
‘international structure’ framework to emphasise the enforcement of an 
international economic power structure as being preferable by the states to the 
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real nature of the transnational system, which he argues to be ‘anarchic’ 
(1988).  According to Keohane (1984) ‘international cooperation’ ensures that 
‘voluntarily co-operating’ states gain ‘positive-sums’.  However, ‘neorealists’ 
(Grieco 1993, Krasner 1991) reinforce the notion that the ‘interstate conflicts’, 
not ‘co-operation’, (as in Keohane), dominate the resolution toward ‘positive-
sum games’.  Taken as a combined framework, the works of Keohane and 
Krasner constitute the ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’ that views ‘states as 
actors’, and the international order (as in the post-World War II period) as the 
‘context’, or the ‘variable’ (Katzenstein 1990: 15).  While the theoretical 
framework summarised above is intact the nature of trade and FDI has 
changed.  MNEs have come to dominate international trade and FDI, and neo-
liberal trade deregulation has amplified this process. 
 
Theorising MNEs, international trade and FDI 
 
Growth in economic relations are not fully explainable by international trade 
theories that present trade as an ‘integrative’ force that fosters convergence 
(Rodrik 2002: 3).  Theories which treat international trade and international 
production [i.e. FDI] that observe MNEs as the agents and mediators of these 
activities have steadily gained significance (Dunning 2000, 2006, Rugman and 
Verbeke 2004, Collinson and Rugman 2007).  This is the present context of 
Australia’s trade and FDI relationship with Japan.  Neo-classical theories 
evolved in the 19th century to explain efficient resource allocation within a 
relatively developed economy but their utilisation to analyse contemporary 
trade and FDI are unsuccessful (North 2003).  As per Dunning, the 
‘international trade’ perspectives inspired by neo-classical framework, such as 
Aliber (1982) and Kojima (1982),  downplay the significance of the advantages 
that MNEs possess and utilise (2000).  Perspectives such as Aliber (1982) and 
Kojima (1982) implicitly assume that in trade all good are exchanged between 
independent buyers and sellers across national borders while in fact, as 
theories that simultaneously cover international trade and international 
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production (i.e. the ‘eclectic paradigm’) explicitly postulate, the transfer of 
immediate products is undertaken within the same MNEs (Dunning 1988: 2).   
 
International trade and international production are the MNEs’ realm.  Intra-
firm trade is an ever expanding avenue of exchange as a means for MNEs to 
consolidate their global competitive positions, and rationalising their cross-
border value added activities (Eden 2005, Ernst 2008, Narula and Dunning 
2000).  A MNE’s behaviour is resultant of its country’s own institutions, and 
cannot be reduced to international trends or global governance organisations’ 
policies (Dunning 2005).  Institutions play a major role in MNE formation 
(Dunning 2006, Dunning and Lundan 2010, Dunning and Zhang 2008).  The 
reverse, however, is also true.  MNEs can, and do, influence institutions and 
government activities. 
 
As international trade and international production form the MNEs’ realm, 
they can only be explained within the same framework of analysis, which is 
what the ‘eclectic paradigm’ does (Ietto-Gillies 1992, Tolentino 2001).  FDI 
distribution is explainable by two types or variables, country-specific (that of 
the host) and firm-specific (that of the MNE) (Dunning et al. 2005: 36).  Since 
the early 1980s, the relationship between the MNEs and national governments 
around the globe have become increasingly co-operative in correspondence to 
the process of globalisation (Dunning 1998).  Australian economy too 
experienced a spectacular resources sector growth via MNE FDI from the early 
1980s onwards.  The debate on the new taxation on resources sector and the 
way which some Australian resource magnates define the matter may perhaps 
be seen as proof of how things have changed.  Neo-liberal trade and tariff 
deregulation allowed MNEs to benefit from free movement of capital, and gave 
them unprecedented access to the Australian market (Stilwell 2008: 71).  MNE 
activities, and their interaction with government policies have long gone 
beyond the post-World War II theoretical formulations. 
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Several elements that can help such a new understanding include a possible 
focus on institutional economics and MNE behaviour.  MNE behaviour 
primarily depend on the country of origin.  Japanese MNEs are relatively more 
integrated with national institutions, that lead to a more cohesion between the 
firms and the rest of the economy (Benito et al. 2003, Ferner et al. 2004).  This 
is the major difference between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon economies (i.e. 
Australia, New Zealand, the UK etc.) (Bayari 2011).  MNEs structure markets 
as they engage in FDI and trade in locations that are not always 
geographically connected (Dunning and Lundan 2010).  That is, MNE FDI and 
trade activities connect different markets, rather than different nations 
connecting their own markets by engaging in trade with each other bilaterally 
and/or multilaterally.  This point is often overlooked.   
 
When we talk about a bilateral free trade agreement we are also discussing 
new rights and freedoms for MNEs that are active in either one or both of the 
two nations, though these MNEs need not be indigenous to those two nations. 
It needs to be stated that an indigenous MNE can do better out of such a 
treaty due to its possession of home advantages.  MNE activities are driven by 
profit motive and they do suffer from forms of unpredictability due to 
differences across borders, and forms of institutional change (Cantwell et al. 
2010).  As a result, MNE activity has become progressively more dependent on 
institutional underpinnings (Dunning and Lundan 2010). 
 
Institutions form the basis of the modern market economies and their 
multilateral relations, including trade and FDI (North 2005).  Studies of 
institutions are frequently piled under ‘neo-institutionalism’ (with its 
variations of ‘institutionalism’ or ‘new institutionalism’) which holds that 
institutions, in formal, informal and culturally-patterned ways, dominate all 
social organisations, and their interaction, and that institutions are 
themselves social products (Acemoglu et al. 2001, DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 
Rodrik et al. 2002).  Institutions of a nation shape the character of its MNEs. 
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Rodrik et al. (2002: 12, 36) place Australia alongside Canada, New Zealand as 
‘neo-European countries’ which developed from colonial origins that proceeded 
with the replication of the UK’s institutions, and present a model of economic 
growth that is based on the quality of institutions, rather than the affects of 
geography, climate, natural resources, or integration with international trade 
links.  In another comparative study that also names Australia, Acemoglu et 
al. state that differences in institutions and state policies are at the root of 
large differences in income per capita across countries (2001: 1395).   An 
important premise of their discussion is that many nations have been linked to 
the post-World War II global system but not all have grown in the same scale.  
For example, in comparison to Australia, not every nation with massive coal 
and mineral reserves have developed into a modern extractive economy that 
contributes to global price setting of raw materials.  
 
Institutional economics framework ignores the critical point in the way in 
which such extractions are dominated by foreign-capital-dominated MNEs.  It 
lacks a framework to calculate net benefits to all parties.  This is because it 
assumes markets to be neutral even though, clearly, government policies and 
MNE activities shape markets.  Nations that possess resources do not 
necessarily possess the capital necessary to extract and trade (export) them.  It 
is also not possible to talk about a fair and equal distribution of gains from the 
exploitation of resources.  This is because capital, and thus profits, belong 
elsewhere.  Taxing these profits is interpreted, by some, as an “unjust” activity 
of a government of the land where the resources are located.   Consequently, 
and speaking strictly in context of this argument’s framework, some nation 
states have increasingly assumed the role of mere gate keepers (for the lack of 
a better description) of resources even though they are located in their lands.  
 
Japanese FDI, Australian exports and neo-liberal trade deregulation 
 
There are then two main factors that govern Australia’s trade (resource 
exports in this instance), 1) MNE activity, and 2) Australia’s institutional 
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framework. Deregulatory policies have been in ascent since the 1980s in 
Australia and they have governed all aspect of Australian economy (Bayari 
2012a).  In the early 1980s [beginning with the Hawke Labor government], 
Australia has initiated neo-liberal bilateral trade and FDI policies and this has 
influenced the context of the economic links with Japan without altering the 
essential structure of the relationship (i.e. Australia’s main exports to Japan 
are coal, minerals, and the newly developing natural gas resources).  
Australia’s policy changes led to alteration of the Japanese FDI in Australia, 
and this was previously discussed (Bayari 2012a).  The policy changes created 
a new atmosphere which  was significantly different from the post-World War 
II period in which the relationship was established.  Since the late 1980s, 
Australia has been campaigning for unilateralist neo-liberal deregulation, and 
import tariff reduction (Bayari 2012a, Beeson 1997, 1996, Capling 2001).    
 
Australia-Japan bilateral relations, and Japanese FDI in Australia has 
inspired many academic inquiries (Beeson 1997, 1999, EAAU 1997, Low and 
Marriott 1996, McQueen 1991, Meaney 1999, Sheridan 1992).   The post-World 
War II Japanese manufacturing FDI in Australia has been significant (Bayari 
2011, 2012a, 2012b, Edgington 1990).  Japanese manufacturers began closing 
factories in Australia from the late 1980s onwards.  Reasons for this are the 
unilateral neo-liberal trade deregulation, and the removal of tariff protections 
in Australia (Bayari 2008).  When the manufacturing industry tariffs began to 
be reduced, the Australian market became unprofitable, due to competition 
from the flood of cheaper imports.  Moreover, Japanese manufacturers have 
also mainly carried out FDI in mainland Asia after the 1985 Plaza Accord.  
The most recent (2007-2011) Japanese FDI in Australia has been 
characterised by acquisitions in Australia’s food, brewery and insurance 
sectors, by Kirin, Asahi and Dai-Ichi correspondingly (Bayari 2012b).  
 
Australia’s post-World War II export trade with Japan is a form of convergence 
of economic interests (Sheridan 1992).  The reason behind this bilateralism is 
not solely the integrative force of trade (as neo-classical framework suggests) 
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but several factors which include; 1) the establishment of the post-World War 
II system in Asia Pacific, 2) the market structures that applied during the Cold 
War, 3) the availability of Australian resources, 4) the existence of MNEs that 
operate in Japan and Australia, 5) availability of Japanese FDI for resource 
extraction and export, and 6) Australia’s unilateral neo-liberal trade 
deregulation policies since the 1980s.   
 
In short, the increase in MNE activity (trade and FDI) and the rise of 
unilateral state policies for neo-liberal trade deregulation are phenomena that 
follow the rise of the post-World War II system.  The effects of the Cold War 
structures are evidently visible in the fact that while Australian resources 
have been exported in increasing quantities, some regions of Asia are still 
developing their resources sectors, and the infrastructure (mines, roads, rail, 
ports and the related cross-territorial access agreements).  Unlike Australian 
economy, their resources were not integrated into the global demand during 
the Cold War, which makes their entry into the markets much slower as 
resources sector requires massive FDI outlay initially.  MNEs in the 
Australian resources sector have grown in size as new reserves were 
discovered, and developed to meet the increasing global demand during the 
Cold War.  FDI and foreign credit have been readily available during the boom 
times. 
 
In Australia, 83% of all mining production, and exports are owned by foreign 
MNEs (Edwards 2011: 1-5).  In this instance it is difficult to use the above-
stated theoretical frameworks that assume that local independent sellers 
market their coal, gas, iron ore, rare earth minerals etc. to foreign independent 
buyers.  Utilising such a framework disregards the MNE FDI in resource 
extraction and exports.  The top mining MNEs that operate in Australia, and 
their foreign ownership percentages are as follows: Xtrata (100%), Anglo-
American (100%), Peabody (100%), Newmont (100%), Barrick (100%), BHP 
Billiton (76%) and Rio Tinto (83%) (Edwards, 2011).  Australian mining 
exports are integrated into the global MNE business of FDI and trade.  BHP 
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Billiton is the biggest mining MNE in the world (and the third largest MNE), 
and  Rio Tinto is the fourth largest mining MNE.  The two form over 70% of all 
listed company resources in Australia (Edwards 2011: 1-5).  It is hence not 
possible to argue that local firms are marketing local resources to foreign 
buyers. 
 
Exports of grains, the other major Australian trade commodity, is another 
interesting case.  The Australian Wheat Board, a major supplier of Japanese 
MNEs, used to be a grain export monopoly of the country (see Anderson et al. 
2007: 17).  In 2011, a US MNE bought the Australian Wheat Board’s grain 
trading and origination arm, and GrainFlow storage and handling business 
from Agrium, after Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) 
approved the deal.  Japanese MNEs called sogo shosha (trading houses) have 
FDI in Australia’s food and resources industries, hence are not solely buyers of 
produce from local producers.  Such MNEs grow produce, raise cattle, extract 
and process natural resources, and export them to Japan, and other markets 
(Ceda 1997, Ikeda 2007, Nicholas et al. 2003). Given the size of the Japanese 
consumer market (approximately six times that of the Australian market) the 
volume of food exports to Japan is also quite substantial (see DFAT 2011).  The 
nature of MNE role in trade is evident.  In Australia, Kirin and Asahi, two 
MNEs, have become, in the last years, major players in beverage and dairy 
production, and exports (Bayari 2012b). By contrast, Australian FDI in Japan 
has historically been minuscule (Bayari 2012a, Australia at Aichi World Expo 
2005: 2, Senate Foreign Affairs et al. 2000: 88-110, 188-192).  This paper does 
not cover the statistics of Australia’s trade with Japan but it should suffice to 
say here that, presently, over 75 per cent of Australian exports to Japan 
consists of coal, iron ore and other minerals, and over 46 per  cent of its 
imports from Japan are automotive vehicles, automotive parts and supplies, 
and engineering equipment (DFAT 2011).  As stated above, Australian 
resources exports (to Japan and everywhere else) are extracted and traded by 
MNEs that are overwhelmingly non-Australian-owned.   
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Trade and international production are two distinct and complementary modes 
of behaviour of a MNE operating in a market, as in the case with the history of 
the Japanese MNEs in Australia (see Bayari 2004).  The official theoretical 
framework that governs Australia’s trade and inward FDI rules is neo-
liberalism, which is defined, in practice, by the unilateral government actions 
since the 1980s that encourage the foreign trade partners, and foreign 
investors to reciprocate with a view to achieve absolute multilateralism 
(Bayari 2012a, Beeson 1996, 1997, Jones 2002).  That is, it is a similar mind 
set to the one behind the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership of eventual 
multilateral zero tariffs.  This somewhat resembles the reality of the 
Australian tariffs policy.  After a series of reductions over several decades, 
Australia unilaterally reduced its manufacturing tariffs to 5 per cent in 
January 2010.   
 
The process of neo-liberal trade deregulation does not correspond to the 
reduction in state power (Dunning and Zhang 2008).  Neo-liberal economics 
has not fully inhabited the present economic policymaking, which contains an 
eclectic mixture of monetarist and Keynesian ideas for domestic matters, with 
a neo-liberal trade policy (Quiggin 2001).  The unilateral neo-liberal trade 
deregulation (with its import tariff reductions) history of Australia have been 
an attempt to redirect the national economy away from the limitations and 
structures that developed during the Cold War, without an accompanying 
strategic decoupling from the Cold War alliances.  Australia’s range of policy 
blueprints for unilateral neo-liberal trade deregulation and import tariff 
reductions are outlined in a government report entitled Australia and the 
Northeast Asian Ascendancy, which is authored by Ross Garnaut (1989).  
Australia was the first GATT member to be reviewed (voluntarily) under the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism in 1989, and for a second time in 1994. 
Naturally, Australia’s efforts were praised in the subsequent GATT report.  
The second review comments that Australia, since 1989, continuously 
implemented an ambitious long-term programme of structural reform, in 
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which continuous trade liberalization and market deregulation are central 
elements (see GATT 1994a, 1994b). 
 
The post-World War II stage of Australia and Japan trade and investment 
relations began in the 1950s.  In the eyes of the Australian government, the 
rest of Asia, as an economic partnership zone, (South East Asia in particular) 
came into focus in the 1990s (Higgott and Nossal 1997, Wesley 1997).  Japan 
worked with Australia in the formation of APEC, that may have had as one of 
its objectives the “inclusion” of the ASEAN economies.  Australia’s dedication 
to the neo-liberal notion of “free trade” was unambiguous in its involvement in 
the formation of APEC.  But the 1997 market collapse in Asia reduced all 
enthusiasm.  During the Howard Liberal/National coalition government (1996-
2007) Australia has moved its focus away from APEC (Terada 2005: 17).  
Presently, there is arguably some enthusiasm for the premises of TPP, and its 
general framework that aims to blackball those who decline to join at first but 
wish to do it later.  
 
The politics, economy and the Cold War onset in the 1950s 
 
The first recorded trade between Australia and Japan took place in 1890, 
when an Osaka firm began importing Australian wool.  The contemporary 
bilateral relationship was established in the period that followed World War 
II.  Australia’s chronic dependence on commodity exports, and Japan’s 
industrial demand for cheap and plentiful supply placed the two nations in a 
co-dependency.  Australia is overtly dependent on inward FDI and trade.  
Japan by contrast has many manufacturing MNEs that export from their local 
and overseas factories.  Japan relies on the consumer markets of Asia, the EU 
and North America,  and continues to provide a trade surplus for Australia 
and remains its third major foreign investor.  The economic bilateralism of the 
two is resolute, and structured due to the geographical proximity, and the 
nature of their trade.   
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The aim of the post-World War II growth policies defined Australia’s future 
relations with Japan (Meaney 1999: 27).  Japan swiftly became a major topic 
for discussion among Australian business leaders and politicians (Japan 
Secretariat 1984, Stockwin 1972, Meaney 1999).  Bilateral relations between 
the two nations began to contain a wide range of issues (Rix and Mouer 1984).  
The 1957 Commerce Agreement and the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation were two major formal agreements that set the tone of the 
bilateral economic, political and trade relations in the post-World War II 
period.  Some in Australia, reportedly, resisted the 1976 agreement due to the 
projected implications of the size differences between the economic strengths of 
the respective partners (Clark 2011: 12).  Still, to this day, the Basic Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation remains the only one of its kind that Australia 
has concluded with any country (Woodard et al. 2007: 16). 
 
The 1957 Commerce Agreement was an important development.  Japan became 
Australia’s largest export market by 1966.  The agreement was signed on 
behalf of Australia on 6 July at the city of Hakone near Mount Fuji by Jack 
McEwen (Fischer 1997: v).  Robert Menzies who also visited Japan in 1957 was 
the first Australian prime minister to do so.  The agreement was signed for 
Japan by the foreign minister, Nobusuke Kishi.  He visited Australia, the 
same year, after he became prime minister.  This was the first such visit from 
Japan.  McEwen, said to be the main architect of Australian post-World War II 
trade policy, later stated that ‘as our trade relationship with Britain was 
diminishing, it seemed to me in the 1950s that the only other comparable 
outlet for our products in the world was Japan, and that is why I went there 
and negotiated the [1957 Commerce Agreement] Treaty’ (quoted in Alford 2007: 
3).  McEwen, despite his apparent conservative credentials, was a resourceful 
expert on global trade of his time.  In 1965, also under McEwen’s ministership, 
the first ever trade agreement between the USSR and Australia was signed.  
In the 1950s and the 60s, the USSR and Japanese economies were growing 
faster than the rest of the world (see Spufford 2010). 
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The post-World War II bilateral trade links between Japan and Australia were 
formulated around the time when the US was forging stronger peacetime links 
with Japan.  The US government was supporting Japan’s entry into 
international markets with such treaties as the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
(signed on 8 September 1951) and the US-Japan Mutual Co-operation and 
Security Treaty (signed on 19 January 1960) (Yamakage 1997: 227-278).  
Japan’s re-entry into the global community also coincided with the ANZUS 
Treaty between the US, Australia and New Zealand, signed on 1 September 
1951 (Meaney 1999: 27, 108).  The treaty did not automatically eventuate at 
the end of the World War II, and was a result of the political changes that 
were developing in Asia at the time, though even before the war, in the 1930s, 
Australia had proposed a form of ‘Pacific Pact’ (Edwards and Pemberton 1992, 
Holdich et al. 2011). 
 
The political developments and the Cold War business 
 
There were two main dimensions in the rise of Australia-Japan relationship in 
the 1950s.  First was obviously the new political developments in Asia, that 
posed challenges the newly instituted post-World War II order in the region, 
second was the perceived need for economic co-operation that was assisted by 
the geographical proximity   (Rix 1986: 180, Watt 1967: 200-208).  As the new 
red lines were drawn across the map of the region, the two nations found 
themselves on the same side of an economic and political structure, as 
independent of their respective national agendas, though not against their 
economic aspirations.  One pressing issue for Australia was how to position 
itself in Asia Pacific with the contraction of the UK’s power, and the rise of the 
US influence (Umetsu 1995).   
 
Overall, in the early 1950s, the prevailing political consensus in Australia was 
that the post-World War II stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond 
depended upon an economically strong Japan, firmly aligned with the West 
(Way 1997).  Australia’s allies, the US and the UK, were both ready to help 
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Japan to achieve this end and encouraged Australia to do the same (Way 1997: 
xv).  However, even after joining GATT, Japan was still not getting ‘most-
favoured-nation-treatment’ from Western nations (except for the US), and it 
used the 1957 Commerce Agreement with Australia to put an argument for 
similar treatment from other nations (Alford 2007: 4).  Japan’s GATT entry 
had some effect on the equation between Australia and the UK.  The Imperial 
Preference System [IPS] (which was then the foundation of the Commonwealth 
nations’ economic alliance) was declining, and the UK’s strength in Asia was 
weakening (Forsberg 2000: 54).  Australia appeared to be convinced that there 
was a need to quickly integrate Japan into the Western fold.  A Federal 
Cabinet submission in Canberra in 1952 stated that:   ‘It is essential that 
Japan be given opportunity to develop and maintain a viable economy … 
Japan’s exclusion from GATT would deprive her of the advantages to be gained 
from trading with the greater part of the free world … and would give her 
strong inducements to redirect her trade towards the USSR and China’ (Brown 
1952: 29).  
 
Consequently, even the question of easing restrictions on imports from Japan 
came to be considered as part of ‘the political objective of keeping Japan’ 
within the Western alliance (Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, 
External Affairs, Trade and Customs and Treasury 1953: 55).  The start of the 
Cold War hastened Australia’s export reorientation away from Britain towards 
Japan (Fitzpatrick 1997: 110).  Australia’s economic relations were altered 
after World War II and the UK’s entrance into the EEC.  The decline of UK 
economic interest in Australia was a steady and continuous post-World War II 
development in the context of the UK withdrawal from its former colonial 
markets (Fitzpatrick 1997: 102-103, Tow and Trood 1997: 1-9).  This process 
hastened as the UK moved closer to the date of its entry into the EEC, which 
required the UK to dissolve the IPS. 
 
As a result of the settlement of the political and trade matters, Japan was able 
focus on its economic growth from the late 1950s onwards (Selden 1997: 312).  
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By 1971, in the Western economic and political bloc, ‘Japanese export 
expansion accounted for as much as 54 per cent in the case of steel products, 
46 per cent for motor vehicles, 90 per cent for civilian use electronic equipment 
and apparatus, 54 per cent for steel vessels and 38 per cent for general 
machinery’ (Tsuru 1993: 83-84).  Japan’s long growth period after World War 
II kept fuelling Australia’s export industries (Senate Foreign Affairs et al. 
2000: 1-8).  The two economies were now in a state of symbiosis. 
 
Thus, Australia’s economic fortunes became very closely tied to those of Japan, 
in the post-World War II growth period (Senate Foreign Affairs et al. 2000: 88-
110).  With the onset of the Cold War, the two economies became more closely 
integrated.  This was because Japan, and other nations of the Western bloc, 
could not access the resources of Eastern Europe, Manchuria, North Korea, 
and China (Cumings 1997: 151).  The global markets were divided into 
political zones that allowed little flexibility for trade, manufacture, and FDI.  
While the Cold War continued a thaw developed.  Kissinger visited China in 
1972, following the Kennedy and Johnston administrations’ interest in 
exploring the establishment of ties with Beijing (Kissinger 2011).  Australia 
started its own ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ with Beijing in 1971 (Clark 2011).  Both 
countries saw their political overtures as a first step towards an economic 
partnership with China.  Australia was over-reliant on the trade and political 
structures that were put in place after World War II (Fitzpatrick 1997: 117-
119).  With the end of the Cold War, the global economic exchange system was 
altered, which was a change that had a significant impact on relations 
between Australia and the world.  Hirst and Thompson argue that:  ‘While the 
Cold War prevailed, competitiveness remained couched in fundamentally 
geopolitical terms: the struggle between the two main politico-ideological blocs 
locked all remaining world issues into a single geomilitary confrontation.  
Once this was over, the differences between countries came newly to the fore, 
and particularly the differences between them in terms of their economic 
performance as measured by their ‘competitiveness’ (Hirst and Thompson 
1999: 114) 
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The end of the Cold War combined with the fact that the EU, Japan, and East 
Asia closed the competition gap between themselves and the US during the 
1980s, meant changes in the global trade order were in the offing (Ravenhill 
1997).  The US began to have less of a desire and a reduced ability to keep 
underwriting the collective good of the international order that had promoted 
world trade and economic growth after World War II (Ravenhill 1997: 83).  As 
the conflict of trade interests re-emerged, competition became more important 
than harmony and order in global markets.  By the middle of the 1990s, the 
revival of trade competition and protectionist measures was intruding into 
Australia’s trade (Head and Bell 1997: 67).   
 
During the Cold War, Australia had a relatively weaker status in world 
economics (Crough et al. 1980: 17).  After the Cold War, it has remained a 
subordinate partner in the global system (Beilharz 1994: 100).  Due to its 
middle-sized market, it has limited influence and power in the post Cold War 
economic relations (Leaver 1997: 89).  With the revival of trade competition 
and protectionist measures, the Australian economy began to feel the pressure 
of the new economic order.  From the early 1980s onwards, in order to 
overcome the limitations of its market size Australia has attempted to promote 
free trade through multilateral and regional economic diplomacy (Cooper et 
al.1993: 172-173).  
 
External challenges to the relationship 
 
Trading blocs are politically driven entities (Doremus et al. 1998: 13).  Overall, 
the triad of the EU, Japan, and the US has not always been stable (McQueen 
2003: 126-127).  The economic relations of the Cold War masked the extent to 
which the Australian economy was dependent on the post-World War II global 
structures of politics and trade (Fitzpatrick 1997: 119).  The Plaza Accord 
negatively affected economic relations between Australia and Japan.  The 
Plaza Accord, signed on 22 September 1985, meant that Japan would 
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intervene in currency markets to appreciate the Japanese yen (Funabashi, 
1988: 3-18). The rise in the Japanese yen reduced the competitiveness of the 
Japanese exports (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 49-57). The inner workings of the 
Japanese market model soon began to lose ground (Hashimoto 2003: 210).  The 
Plaza Accord caused a major shift of Japanese manufacturing to Asia because 
of the new organisation of work, and the new FDI patterns. With the 
reorganisation of manufacturing, Japan needed less raw materials from 
Australia, as it focused more and more on value-added products and reduced 
its heavy manufacturing industries.  From the  late 1980s onwards, 
manufacturing MNES, including the Japanese, could not sustain sufficient 
economies of scale in such a small market without the protection of the tariff 
barriers that had originally caused them to invest.   
 
The collapse of the ‘bubble economy’ with the 1992 crash of Tokyo Stock 
Exchange led to an extended period of economic stagnation (Halevi and 
Lucarelli 2002: 35).  The malaise lasted several decades and contributed to the 
stagnation of economic relations between Australia and Japan.  The 
appreciation of Japanese currency led to a series of events that affected the 
market linkages between Japan and Australia.  ‘The Bank of Japan followed 
Alan Greenspan’s massive monetary expansion after the 1987 stock market 
crash.  Exchange rate up, interest rates down, fiscal deficit up … The bubble 
[economy] was inevitable.  Then … the Bank of Japan … changing tack to 
rigorous monetarism … abruptly raised interest rates in December 1989 and 
… abolished window guidance, the most important channel of liquidity.  The 
bubble burst and the long agony of debt inflation … began’ (Schmiegelow 2003: 
81).  After the 1992 collapse, the Japanese government began to focus on 
attracting foreign investors to revitalise the Japanese economy (JETRO 2003: 
5).  In 1997, Asia experienced a sharp downturn in business and trade activity, 
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APEC and MFP 
 
There are two developments that represented the attempts by Japan and 
Australia to extend their bilateralism into new domains.  During its own 
market deregulation in the 1980s, Australia became fascinated with Japan’s 
long term growth performance (Japan Secretariat 1986, Australia-Japan 
Relations Symposium, 1986, 1988).  Their bilateral relationship was a factor in 
Australian responses to regional economic affairs (Crawford and Okita 1976; 
Toyama and Tisdell 1991).  It was also a reflection of the global milieu.  In the 
early 1980s, Japan and Australia showed an effective joint leadership. The 
establishment of APEC is an example of this (Funabashi 1995).  APEC was 
conceived as a possible future common market for the Asia-Pacific region. 
Japan lobbied for it intensely (de Prado Yepes 2003: 3).  After years of 
discussions, APEC was formally proposed and it was finally hosted by 
Australia in 1989.  In APEC, Australia’s neo-liberal policymakers ‘found’ hopes 
of ‘free trade’ partners across Asia-Pacific and had dreams of stronger market 
links with Japan (Beeson 1996: 35-40).  ‘Their ... regional profiles helped Tokyo 
and Canberra cooperate in soliciting a regional consensus about the value of 
the regional institution for multilateral cooperation, not only for Asian 
countries but also for the United States’ (Soeya 2001: 23).  It was a significant 
achievement among all the ‘globalisation’ currents but APEC has not met the 
original expectations (Tracy 1997).  A former Australian foreign minister 
suggested Australia’s future in East Asia as being independent of its APEC 
membership and authorship (FitzGerald 1997: 9).  The TPP framework is the 
new multilateral project that somewhat resembles the APEC’s principle 
premises. 
 
In the boom environment of the 1980s, there were plans to tie Australia’s 
resources with Japanese ‘know-how’ to develop major projects such as the 
Multi Function Polis (MFP), which was celebrated and promoted both by 
Japanese experts and by journalists in Australia  (Inkster 1991: 1-23, 
Hamilton 1991: chapter 1).  The project was subsequently abandoned due to 
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several factors, one of which was the bursting of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’ in 
1992.  The MFP project was the peak of all the efforts to further Japan-
Australia economic relations, and its cancellation was a major letdown for 
planners, politicians, academics, and the business world alike (Parker 1998: 1-
4).  The MFP was to involve the building of a small city with the latest 
technological advances which would be a mixture of an expo, techno-park or 
Silicon Valley, depending on which account one reads. It was Australian 
requests to Japan for closer economic links that initiated the MFP 
(McCormack 1991).  It was an attempt by the 1980s ‘Japanese development 
model’ to respond to Australian politicians’ requests for economic help 
(McCormack 1998: 32).  However it became a failed attempt at technology 
transfer that was different from the prior Japanese FDI modes in Australia 




From the ‘post-bubble’ 1990s onwards, Australia and Japan sought new 
definitions for their relationship.  Japan began to think of Australia as a 
partner in a new type of multilateralism (Takaki 1994: 12), as well as a co-
participant in regional security (Sajima 1996: 28).  The need for political 
cooperation was seen as a necessity due to the nature of the economic links 
between Australia and Japan (Takaki 1994).  For both countries, economic 
relations in the region were never detached from global or regional strategic 
interests (Bolt 1990: 60).  As the economic links was under threat since 
Japan’s recession that began in the 1992, ‘commonality of interests’ in regional 
security and in regional economic cooperation was highlighted to reinforce the 
relationship (Australia-Japan Research Centre 1994: 7).  A ‘commonality 
between Japan and Australia … exists with respect to the ambiguous nature of 
their identities as regional actors … Japan and Australia … have always had 
to find a delicate balance between [their] alliances and diplomacy’ (Soeya 2001: 
23).  The bilateral lapse in economic links were addressed in two reports, 
Strengthening Australia-Japan Economic Relations (De Brouwer and Warren 
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2001), and Japan’s Economy, Implications for Australia (Senate Foreign 
Affairs et al. 2000).  The first report analyses the relationship from the point of 
view of trade management and deregulation.  These reports make several 
recommendations for improving market relations between Japan and 
Australia.  The second report was the result of a Senate sub-committee inquiry 
into the relative lack of recent Japanese initiatives in Australia (Senate 
Foreign Affairs et al. 2000).  Japan and Australia continue to seek a new 
direction in their relationship. The future of the relationship is guided by the 
current free trade agreement discussions (see Australia Japan Trade and 
Economic Framework 2003: 10-12).  Currently there are more than 70 
bilateral arrangements between Australia and Japan (JETRO 2012).  The 
fourteenth round of Australia-Japan free trade agreement negotiations was 




With the end of the Cold War and the rise of China, Japan’s economic links 
with its neighbours were re-aligned (Soderbeg 2011).  Under neo-liberal 
financial deregulation, the global economy has gone passed the period of 
division among the East, the West, and the non-aligned.  There is now 
increasingly better access to resources in Mongolia, Russian Far East, and 
Kazakhstan, which was not a possibility during the Cold War (see Jiji 2011).  
Parts of the Asian mainland have become major resource export zones.  For 
the most part, global mining supplies are now distributed primarily by 
demand and price.  There is a Mongolian export  boom in rare earth, copper, 
iron, silver and coal, all of which are transported via Far East Russia (Humber 
and Kate 2011).  Moreover, the Mongolian reserves of rare earth minerals are 
also opening up to value-added processing (Harrison 2010).  This would have 
been impossible three decades ago, politically and logistically.  
 
Asia’s strategic resources sector is being reorganised. For close to a decade 
Chinese companies have become dominant exporters of rare earth minerals 
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(Simpkins 2009). China has become the biggest supplier and Japan is the 
biggest exporter of these minerals (Bradsher 2009).  In 1999, the Chinese 
government introduced export quotas for rare earths and begun reducing 
exports in 2001 with sizeable reductions in 2009 and 2010 (Keenan 2011).  The 
region’s major MNEs in Japan and South Korea have been suffering a supply 
shortage of these strategic resources.  Chinese manufacturers will soon be 
unable to meet their own needs despite China’s production capacity (Ratnam 
2011).  There are however vast potential rare earth reserves elsewhere  
(Scissors 2011).  It is expected that mining MNEs in Australia can contribute 
to meeting the rare earth demand shortfall (Simpkins 2009).  Industry 
analysts suggest that Australia, with its reserves that forms 46 per cent of 
rare earth minerals in the world, may be able to supply all of Asia by 2014 
(Harrison 2010).  There have been some disagreements over the present status 
of the sea lanes in international waters in the South China Sea (Metzler 2011, 
Richardson 2011c).  This may prove to be a significant matter for Australia 
because its exports to Japan, Russian Far East and South Korea go through 
the same international waterways (Kaneko 2011). 
 
Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) has introduced new 
regulations on the nation’s strategic resources and locations to ensure a policy 
of maintaining its position as a reliable supplier to all its trading partners 
(Dorling 2011, Keenan 2011).  This contributes to the maintenance of the 
existing export structures.  Australia’s [then] Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd in 
November 2010 talks with [then] Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara 
reaffirmed Australia’s commitment to provide a reliable long-term supply of 
rare earth minerals (AAP 2010, AFP 2010).   
 
In August 2011, the world began to feel the effects of the US credit downgrade, 
which was followed by a downgrade for Japan.  This followed the ‘Lehman 
Brothers shock’ in September 2008, and its aftermath, which did not impact on 
Australian trade and investment relations with Japan (see Bayari 2012b on 
the investment aspect).  Japanese FDI in Australia has in fact increased due to 
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several major acquisitions.  Statistics show that the nature and the volume of 
trade between Australia and Japan has not been greatly altered since the 
‘Lehman Brothers shock’ (see DFAT 2011).  Hence, there were no changes in 




Australia has maintained a continuous trade and FDI relationship with Japan, 
since the 1950s, which was constructed under historically specific conditions 
that affected them both.  The relationship has continued beyond the beginning 
and the end of Cold War.  The paper has argued that the ‘eclectic paradigm’ of 
international trade and FDI can be applied to this relationship.  Both nations 
have had to deal with their own specific problems while maintaining the 
relationship, and the analysis here has been an attempt to define its history 
and the global politics context.  Constrained by the structures developed as a 
result of the Cold War economics, Australia has experienced the pressures of 
the post-Cold War competition.  Consequently, Australia began to reduce 
tariffs in multiple and clearly marked stages, while advocating the same to 
others, as it started on a path of neo-liberal deregulation in the 1980s.  
Australia’s relationship with Japan has been through decades of global 
political and economic changes.  While benefiting from the post-World War II 
system governed by the WTO (and the preceding GATT) rounds, Australia and 
Japan have also relied on their economic partnership, which originated from 
specific historical and political conditions.  After the Cold War ended the global 
trade order has changed with the opening of new markets for resources and 
manufactures.  However, Australian trade and FDI relations with Japan has 
predominantly followed the structural path that was developed in the 1950s. 
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